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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Various types of scour can confront the engineer, who 
has to design and construct a hydraulic structure in a 
marine environment. The engineer is interested in the 
magnitude of the scour to be expected and its development 
in time. He hopes that such information, if at all available, 
is accurate and that he can base his design and 
construction method on such information without meeting 
any unexpected hydr-aulic response. 
 
In principle the engineer can react differently, 
according to the situation: 
 
1  he accepts that scour will develop after completion 
of the structure and, given its extent and rate of 
development, he takes measures to prevent (or 
limit) damage to the structure and loss of stability; 
2 he tries to prevent the scour or, in any case, takes 
measures to keep it away from the structure; 
3 he is aware of the possibility that the works will be 
only exposed to scour during construction and he 
takes temporary measures to limit the damage; 
4 he completely under-estimates or is not aware of 
any danger of scour and must repair the damage 
afterwards against high cost. 
 
In my long professional life I have encountered scour 
in many different projects and I was always able to act in 
accordance with one of the first three options. Luckily, I 
did not come in the last situation during my professional 
career but, as a trainee, I saw how serious the 
consequences can be of non-envisaged scour.  
 
Below, I will elaborate on the said situations, as 
encountered by my colleagues and myself, by presenting 
five case histories. They will be presented in chronological 
order as one learns always from mistakes. Moreover, one 
starts usually by having responsibility for small projetcs 
and ends up doing large projects. 
II. II. CASE HISTORY ONE: FAILURE OF  TIDAL 
CLOSURE JUST AFTER  COMPLETION (NETHERLANDS) 
A. Prologue  
Tidal closures require a very special skill of hydraulic 
engineering. The risks are not always fully recognized 
and this may lead easily to a complete failure. Such 
failure is very serious in the sense that many months of 
preparation might be lost in less than one hour. In the 
example given below the situation no. 4, described in the 
Introduction, of not being aware of the threat of scour is 
demonstrated. 
B. Closure Concept 
In 1954 a tidal inlet in the south western part of The 
Netherlands, called 'Dijkwater', would be closed. 
 
 The closure concept was: 
 
(a) protect bed of 55 m wide tidal channel by means of 
fascine mattresses; 
(b) construction of sand body of future polder dyke on 
the mudflats (which became dry during low tide); 
(c) protect temporarily slopes of sand body in and near 
axis of future closure bund at both sides of tidal 
channel by means of brushwood bank protection 
works ballasted with stone (Fig. 1); 
(d) construct jetty across tidal channel and close this 
channel in one neap tide by transforming jetty into 
cofferdam filled with clay. 
 
On 26th August the closure works started at low tide 
at 07.30 hours. At 11.00 hours a 70 m long cofferdam had 
been formed having a maximum height of 4 m by nailing 
boards to the jetty piles and bracings and dumping clay 
inside the cofferdam from side tipping narrow gauge 
railway wagons crossing the jetty from both sides (Fig. 
2). 
At that point in time the closure appeared to have been 
successful.  
. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Layer of three horizontally placed fascine mattresses (A1-A3) at east abutment, bordered by bed / bank protection mattress (B),  
   reed 'wall' (C) and light slope protection of brushwood (D) 
 
  
Figure 2.  The tidal closure, effected by means of a cofferdam filled up with clay during the rising tide 
C. The Failure due to Scour 
 
 
At one side of the channel it had been neglected, however, 
to remove the aforementioned bank protection (Fig. 1) 
prior to start of closure. When outside high water reached 
its peak it was roughly 1.5 m higher than the water level in 
the closed-off tidal inlet. Meanwhile the water had started 
to flow through the brushwood layer, thick  0.3 m from 
outside to inside and the adjacent layer of three mattresses 
(B and A in Fig. 1). The head difference had become 1.5 
m over 4 m distance. The through-flow took the sand out 
of the adjacent sand body (Fig. 3). Within 30 minutes a 40 
m wide breach had formed and all works for the closure 
which had been prepared during a period of 5 months 
could be considered as total loss. Ultimately, the width of 
the breach became 140 m. A new attempt was made 1½ 
months later at considerable cost by constructing a 
combined vertical and horizontal closure using shales (a 
waste product of Dutch coal mining operations).
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Breach of  the clay-filled cofferdam at the east abutment a few 
minutes prior to High Water [4]. 
 
III. CASE HISTORY TWO : CLOSURE OF A TIDAL 
INLET (GHANA) 
A. Prologue  
The project1 described in this Section is a typical 
example of situation no. 3: the designer  knows that the 
works will be only exposed to scour during construction 
and he takes temporary measures to limit the damage. 
Moreover, the project illustrates very well the concept of 
appropriate technology. Last but not least, a lack of 
quantitive data is normal in that kind of situations and the 
engineer has to use his intuition, common sense and and 
knowledge of well-known hydraulic and morphologic 
phenomena to find daily a solution to new problems.  
B. Outline of the Problem 
 
The town of Keta is situated in the south- east of 
Ghana, near the delta of the Volta River. Keta, a town of 
18,000 inhabitants, is built on the small sand ridge 
between the Gulf of Guinee and the Keta Lagoon. The 
water level of this lagoon (area 300 km2, which is 115 
square miles) varies with the seasons. 
 
 
As the water levels are determined by nature, the rate of 
increase of water levels as well as the maximum water 
level reached vary from year to year. The sand ridge 
between lagoon and sea is relatively narrow, the lands 
around the lagoon are swampy. Therefore most of the 
                                                          
1 The only publication is in the Dutch language: [6] 
population lives on the sand ridge and on its slopes at the 
side of the lagoon (Fig. 4) 
 
Figure 4.  Situation of the gap (called Kedzi Canal) in the 
sand ridge 
 
 
Each year the water level of the lagoon will rise and 
again each year there is a chance that the water level will 
become so high that houses and crops are inundated. In 
most cases, such inundation, though inconvenient, is 
accepted. In certain years, however, (and this happened 
for instance in 1963 and 1968) the water level becomes 
so high (i.e. 0.5 to 1 m of water in houses and on roads) 
that the situation is very dangerous (danger of many 
people being drowned, epidemics, transport of food  
hampered). Consequently, it was decided in 1963 as well 
as in 1968 to make a small cut in the aforementioned sand  
ridge.  
 
In both cases the excess water was discharged 
succesfully into the sea and, within five days, the water 
level had dropped 1 m (1963) and 1.2 m (1968). 
However, as a consequence of this mass evacuation of 
floodwater, a tidal inlet had formed (width of opening 
250 m, depth 4.5 m).  
The inlet formed in November 1963 (apart from some 
human assistance) closed after 11 months. This was 
mainly due to the littoral drift along the coast.  
The gap made in August 1968 behaved differently. It 
"travelled" over a distance of 350 m and there were no 
signs after nine months that it would close itself. 
Therefore the Government of Ghana requested my 
employer to "give general advice to the staff of the Public 
Works Department (P.W.D.) on problems relating to the 
closure of the gap". 
After two short visits to the site, during which the gap 
was surveyed, cross sections made and the flow pattern 
during ebb and f lood was studied, an advice on closure 
of the gap was prepared. P.W.D.  agreed in principle with 
the plans and it was agreed that the State Construction 
Corporation, S.C.C., would carry out the work on a 
daywork basis under our supervision. 
C. The Closure Concept 
 
The plan for closure and subsequently also the 
execution was based on the use of local materials (sand, 
sandbags, mats of reed for bed and slope protection) as 
well as on the availability of road building plant (scrapers 
and bulldozers). 
Though the tidal differences were moderate (0.6 m at 
neap tide to 1.5 m at spring tide), the tidal prism (5 
million m3), the extent of the gap (depth 3 m, width 200 
m) and, finally, the fact that all soil in bed and banks of 
the gap was (coarse) sand, made the job not an easy one. 
The main principle followed throughout has been the 
intermediate protection by means of reed mats of slopes 
and embankments made of sand against the scouring 
force of the tides. Sandbags (weight 250 kg each) were 
placed neatly on the mats to a depth of 1.8 m under water 
by local f ishermen (Fig. 8).  
During the gradual narrowing of the gap velocities were 
measured of 2 to 3 m/sec and once, after a line squall, as 
high as 4 m/sec. 
D. How Scour during Construction was being dealt 
with 
 
An important parameter for scour in sand is the average 
grain size. At Keta the grain size of the soil particles in 
and around the gap varied beteen 0.5 and 2 mm which 
signifies coarse sand and this is of prime importance for 
the success of the closure.  
 
The width of the gap during the first visit was 200 m 
and the max. current velocities measured varied between 
1 and 1.5 m/s. The ebb current turned out to be stronger 
than the flood current. The main current during ebb 
crossed the gap more or less diagonally and tended to 
erode the eastern side of the gap even further. The first 
objective was therefore to stop erosion at the eastern 
shore of the gap. Accordigly, during low tide, a strip of 
shore, wide 3 to 30 m (the last in axis of closure) and 
long 200 m was protected by placing bags of sand on reed 
mats. An under water sill (level 2 m below average water 
level) was formed by placing reed mats in the axis of 
closure over a length of 30 m (perpendicular to the 
current) and a width of 3.6 m. In this manner a sill of 50 
m length (width 3.6 to 30 m) would  be available for the 
final closure (see Fig. 6).  
 
Subsequently, the gap was narrowed by bulldozers, 
pushing out sand from the western shore into the gap. 
During the construction of the sand dam it turned out to 
be necessary to protect the end of the heap of sand each 
afternoon to avoid serious scour during the night. These 
protection works became more and more sophisticated as 
the gap narrowed and velocities increased. A sketch of 
the protection.is given in Fig. 5. In general, such 
protection works were carried out during a period of 3 
hours prior to darkness (at 6 p.m.) the exact timing 
depended also on the tide. Thirty to forty men and women 
were involved in filling, transporting and placing the 
heavy bags (200 to 250 in number) over an area 80 to 120 
m2 of mats, most of it under water. In general such 
protection could withstand velocities of 1.5 to 3 m/s.
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Daily slope protection at end of sand dam using 
reed mats and sand bags 
Figure 6.  Over view of closure plan 
 
The sand dam was ultimately pushed out over a 
distance of 160 m during a period of 10 days. Obviously 
daily progress slowed down when the gap became 
narrower and current velocities increased. During the last 
days the daily progress was not more then 10 m and sand 
losses amounted to more than 50 %. During the night 
scour in front of the protected underwater slope was 1.5 
m.  
E. The Closure Works  
 
Preparatory works started during the second half of 
August. Plant started to move into site on 1st September 
and on 5th September the first works to be done 
(protection of bed and slope of gap, stockpiling of sand) 
were in full progress.  
 
 
 
 
On the 23rd September the actual closure works 
commenced by pushing a sand dam forward across the 
gap. On the 2nd of October this work had progressed 
sofar that the last move for closure could be made. At that 
time a sand dam having a length of 160 m had been 
constructed. The gap which was left measured 40 m in 
width and was closed successfully on the 3rd of October 
1969 by placing  appr. 6,000 sandbags in the gap. This 
was done by 250 persons during a period of four hours 
(Fig. 9).  
 
  F. Evaluation  
 
No doubt, the weakest point in the closure concept was 
the very narrow (3.6 m wide) sill. If deep scour had 
developed at one or both sides of the sill it would have 
collapsed. Another point of concern was scour, which 
could develop in the unprotected stretch between end of 
sand dam and end of sill. It helped that the narrowing of 
the gap coïncided in time with a decrease in tidal 
amplitude. Obviously, the day selected for closure was 
close (i.e. two days prior) to a neaptide.  
 
The reed mats turned out to be strong and sandtight. 
Nevertheless, the daily returning afternoon exercise of 
protecting the end of the sand dam became more and 
more difficult (Fig. 7).  
 
Rainstorms (lasting only a few hours) tended to induce 
wind set up which in turn resulted in high current 
velocities (up to 4 m /s).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Construction of sand dam in relation to tidal currents 
 Figure 8.   Slope protection at end of dam      Figure 9. Closure in progress 
 
IV. CASE HISTORY THREE : DESIGN AND 
CONSTRUCTION OF  SEA DEFENCES (GUYANA) 
A. Prologue 
 
Polders on the coast are normally protected against high 
tides and salt water intrusion by means of embankments. 
These embankments, locally called sea dykes, sea 
defences or sea walls, not only have to withstand high 
water levels but must also resist wave attack and remain 
stable when the foreshore is eroded by wave action or by 
the marine currents along the coast. Because of this 
multi-purpose function sea dykes  are not always just earth 
embankments but are provided in many places with 
revetments, copings, sea side toe protection and internal 
drainage. 
 
In this Section some significant design and construction 
aspects of sea dykes built and still to be built along the 
coast of Guyana and related to scour will be discussed 
[7].  
It is a typical example of situation 1: accept the scour and 
take measures to prevent damage and loss of stability to 
the structure. 
B. Some Particulars of the Coastal Plain and Near-
Shore Belt 
 
The coast of Guyana is part of a much larger unity, the 
some 1,500 km long coast between the Amazon and 
Orinoco Rivers which has everywhere equal 
environmental conditions and similar geographical 
features. The area which is roughly enclosed by the 
Amazon River, the Orinoco River and the Atlantic Ocean 
has been known as the Guianas since about 1500 A.D. 
The length of the coast of Guyana, between Punta Playa 
(Venezuelan border) and the Courentyne River (Surinam 
border) is about 425 kms .  
The fertile coastal plain of Guyana is a comparitively 
narrow, low-lying area which consists of soft clayey 
soils. The area slopes very gently down to the sea. Along 
the shore line groundlevels vary between 0.3 m below 
and appr. 0.5 m above mean sea level (MSL). The tides, 
however, normally rise to some 1.5 m above MSL. 
Consequently, occupation and cultivation on the coast is 
only possible when there is a natural or man-made 
protection against higher sea levels.  
Agricultural development started with the creation of 
plantations laid out perpendicular to the coastline. When 
there were no natural sand reefs, flooding was checked by 
earthdams built some distance inland and parallel to the 
coastline. At the start earth embankments could be kept 
low because of their location and the natural protection 
provided by mangrove and gourida bush. 
Now the coast forms a unity with the shallow near-
shore belt of the oceanic shelf which presents a pattern of 
wave-like mud shoals moving slowly from east to west. 
On the coast the pattern manifests itself in the natural 
situation by a periodic occurrence of accretion and 
erosion. During the past 200 years the resulting effect has 
been a general regression of the coast. 
The vulnerable earth dams mentioned above will provide 
the required protection against high water levels but 
cannot withstand the attack of waves which reach the 
embankments as soon as the vegetation on the foreshore 
has been destroyed by the erosion forces following the 
passing of a mud shoal. 
In the past the solution was to accept the regression of the 
coast-line and to build a new earth dam further inland. 
During the 20th century, however, it has become practice 
in the relatively densely populated and more developed 
shows a succession of typical small bays.  
agricultural areas to strengthen the earth embankments 
against wave attack by revetments and copingwalls. This 
was done in order to stop locally a further regression of 
the coastline. But the system turned out not to be 
successful. In the late sixties of the last century this 
situation was not any longer accepted and it was decided 
to try to design sea defences which do not collapse, which 
can permanenetly resist erosion and check regression of 
the coast line. 
During the studies, made to enable a feasible design to be 
developed, values for various parameters had to be 
determined such as: erosion depth of foreshore, duration 
of an erosion cycle, rates of the resulting regression of the 
unprotected coast line, soil characteristics, wave attack, 
etc. Apart from the study of these typical design 
parameters an inventory and analysis was also made as 
regard the existing sea defences (some 320 km of which 
50 % without any slope protection) and why they always 
failed as soon as the mud shoal had passed. 
 
It is relevant here to summarize the studies regarding 
the earlier mentioned traveling mud shoals. The large 
mud banks, travelling along the coast at regular intervals, 
are the most striking feature of the offshore hydrography 
of the Guyana coast. The average length of a bank is 
about 45 kilometers. The pattern of mud fades away at a 
depth of about 18 meters, at a distance of about 25 
kilometers from the coast. This is also the place where the 
muddy bottom of the coastal belt changes to the harder 
and coarser surface of the continental shelf. 
The mud banks travelling along the coast show a more 
or less cyclic development of the shore at each place on 
the coast. Generally, a large mud flat can be observed in 
an area where the crest of a mud bank is situated off the 
coast. The drying line may lie some kilometres seaward 
from the high water mark which also shifts seaward by 
sedimentation. The shoal apparently protects the coast 
against the attack of waves and currents. Some time later 
mangroves of the species Avicennia Nitida start growing 
on the soft mud when its surface rises above MSL. The 
occurrence of young growth of this type of vegetation is 
a clear indication of accretion. The fringe of the bush of 
Avicennia trees gradually moves seaward over the mud 
flat in the course of time. It starts later and its rate of 
advance is smaller than is the case with the growing mud  
flat. 
Meanwhile, the mud shoal is attacked by erosion, 
gradually it becomes narrower, and it attains the 
appearance of an abrasion plain. The vegetation stops 
advancing. Later, when the abrasion reaches the bush 
fringe and no fresh sidements are any more deposited in 
the bush area, the vegetation is affected and trees are 
seen dying; even farther landward. Dead trees are found 
on the shore in front of the old vegetation when the 
erosion cuts into the vegetated coast. The offshore 
bottom becomes steep in the area where the trough 
between two mud banks meets the shore. Often, in the 
absence of much sand, this part of the eroding shore 
 Erosion has formed a specific pattern of small gullies 
in front of the steep edge of the eroding mud plain. 
These phenomena characterize an eroding coast. 
In this period swell penetrates up to the coast and breaks 
on or near the shore. The erosion of the coast proceeds 
until, suddenly, another mud flat starts forming in front 
of the eroded shore. 
Fixation of a shore by a sea defence will prevent a 
recession of the shore but of course it cannot prevent the 
erosion of mud from the offshore bottom of the sea. 
C. Scope of the Problem   
Between the passing of two travelling mudbanks the 
shore in front of the sea defence erodes and the average 
level of the foreshore is lowered significally. This in turn 
results in higher waves reaching the sea defence and, 
consequently, in heavier wave attack and higher wave 
run-up on the sea defence. This was acted upon during 
the past by protecting the earth dam with a revetment 
and by placing a concrete wall (called coping), 0.5 - 2 
metres high, on top of the earthdam (Figure 10). The 
latter was introduced when it was experienced that an 
earth dam having a height of 4 to 5 metres lost its 
stability on the soft clay layers. The erosion of the 
foreshore however increases the height of the sea 
defence in relation to the level of the foreshore and 
practically everywhere the sea defence collapsed and 
had to be abandoned during the period (5-10 years) 
lapsing between the passing of two mudbanks. The 
authorities then had only one option left: accept the 
regression of the coast and to place the sea defence 
further inland..  
The team, of which the writer was a member, had the 
task to prepare a new design for the sea defence taking 
into account: 
 
- expected erosion of the foreshore  
- wave attack and wave run-up  
- sub-soil constraints  
- economy of construction  
- local capabilities for construction  
- limited requirements for maintenance 
D. Design of a New Cross-Section for Sea 
Defences. 
It turned out to be quite a challenge to prepare a new 
design for the cross-section of the sea defences in 
Guyana.  
An important issue was, for instance the wave attack. The 
seaward slope of a seawall is subject to continuous attack 
by waves. The zone of attack shifts up and down with the 
tide. The effect of the waves on the slope depends on the 
gradient of the slope and from this point of view a gentle 
slope is preferable. However, length of slope and volume 
of sea defence increase with a flattening of the slope. 
Consequently, the slope's gradient is a compromise 
between hydraulic, structural and economic 
considerations. 
Assuming that a sea defence is sufficiently high to 
prevent overtopping during high water levels, 
overtopping will then only take place by wave action. In 
Guyana design water levels or water levels of 0.3 m 
below design water level are much more frequent than in 
the Netherlands. But frequent overtopping with saline 
water is detremental to the grassed (land side) slopes and 
will also increase the salt content in the acquifer in the 
polder. Loss of the grass cover on the slopes (especially 
in the tropics) will utlimately result in a dryed-out 
cracked clay layer which is easily weakened by rain and 
seawater and this in turn may lead to soil- mechanical 
failure of the slope. Bearing this in mind a (rather low) 
design criterion of 0.1 liter per m per sec. for overtopping 
was taken. 
All these considerations led to a design height of the 
seadefence (measured from level of eroded foreshore up 
to level of the crest) of 7.2 m (24 ft).  
.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.   Typical cross sections of Sea Defences prior to 1970 
 
But it was known from experience, soil mechanical 
tests and slope stability calculations that such an 
embankment would loss its stability as soon as the 
foreshore erosion had progressed significantly! 
Apart from this loss of stability because of erosion near 
the toe, sea defences had collapsed in the past due to 
overtopping, damage to the coping or damage to the 
revetment. This meant that a lower crest was no solution 
to the problem and that also the coping and revetment 
needed improvement.  
A survey of existing and (partly) collapsed embankments 
learned that all revetments made in the past were of the 
rigid type placed on rather soft and not always well 
compacted clay. It was therefore decided to introduce a 
new type of revetment: sand-mastic grouted stone. The 
latter not only provides high flexibility combined with 
physical strength, water tightness and durability but also 
turned out to be the most economical solution. 
During construction special care would be required for 
connection to the revetment and to the use of flexible 
joints between coping elements. 
 
To overcome the stability problem two elements were 
introduced into the cross section:  
- a 15 m (50 ft) m long berm at the average level 
of low water (50.00 GD)2 between actual upper 
embankment and lower embankment (toe 
structure) 
- a rip rap layer on the slope of the upper 
embankment; this limited wave run up and, 
consequently, the height of the crest. 
                                                          
2 GD = Georgetown datum, levels are in ft. 
The toe structure is required between the berm at a level 
of 50 GD and the foreshore, the level of which may vary 
but for oceanic coasts can be considered to be at a lowest 
level of 40 GD. 
In addition to its primary purpose to stop the cyclic 
erosion undermining the sea defence the toe structure 
should resist eroding forces of wave action and the 
downward rush of water following the breaking of waves 
at lower tidal levels. Moreover, the design should allow 
for possible differences between the pore pressure inside 
the sea defence and the water level outside, when the tide 
is out. 
 
After due consideration of various alternatives it was 
concluded that a graded filter type toe protection would 
meet fully the design criteria and would also be cheapest 
to construct. The new cross-section as developed is 
shown in Fig. 11. 
 
Though copings in general cannot be recommended for 
incorperation in sea defences. It was felt that use of a 
coping of limited height would reduce the cost of 
construction of the sea defence significantly. It was 
therefore decided to present an alternative cross-section. 
for the sea defence incorporating a coping (Fig. 12).  
E. Construction and Monitoring  
The design as developed during the studies and briefly 
reviewed in the foregoing sections was applied in practice 
for the sea defence in front of the capital, Georgetown. 
The existing sea defence was re-constructed during the 
period 1973-1976. Hydraulic studies had indicated that 
erosion of the foreshore was due to start in 1973. In fact 
erosion started during 1974 and the foreshore gradually 
eroded from an average level of 54 GD during the period 
1936-1969 at 30 metres from the toe of the defence down 
to 49 GD (1976).  
Now, in 2006, the re-constructed sea defence has been 
in operation for thirty years and so far has fully satisfied 
the design criteria. This cannot be said about adjacent 
sections of sea defence, which were also re-constructed 
during the sixties and early seventies (but in accordance 
with the designs in use up to 1970). In these sections 
oversplash still poses problems occasionally and the rigid 
concrete slab revetments on the outer slope tend to 
deteriorate quickly.   
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Cross- section of new design 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Cross- section of new design: alternative with coping and reduced width of berm 
V. CASE HISTORY FOUR: SCOUR DURING 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE FENI DAM 
(BANGLADESH) 
A. Prologue  
The design and construction of the Feni Dam in 
Bangladesh (1984-1985) is considered internationally as 
an outstanding example of the use of appropriate 
technology in hydraulic engineering. The actual final 
tidal closure was effected for the greater part by utilizing 
manpower at a large scale. This can best be illustrated by 
giving some figures about the construction of the closure 
bund on the day of closure (28th February 1985): on that 
day the estuary was closed during ebb tide by means of a 
800 long, 2.5 m high dam  in which 650,000 bags filled 
with clay were placed by 12,000 labourers in a period of 
six hours. 
Particulars of design and construction can be found in 
various publications3 while National Geographic included 
the project in their publication [3].  
 
Reference is made to these publications for details of 
the Project. Here, only the problems caused by scour will 
be discussed. The situations 2 and 3, as described in 
Section I, apply. 
B. Site Conditions  
Tides with large amplitudes occur at the closure site. In 
the axis of closure, the shoals are at a level4 of SOB +0 to 
+1.00 m. The low water level at the closure dam site is 
more or less constant, during both spring and neap tides, 
and is essentially governed by the bathymetry at the site 
and the quantity of upland discharge. It can be considered 
to be at SOB. During the dry season the high water levels 
will be at its lowest by the end of February, i.e. during 
neap tide at SOB + 1.80 m and during springtide at SOB 
+ 4.0 m. During the wet season spring tide levels are 
considerably higher. 
A remarkable aspect of the tide in the Feni Estuary is the 
uneven distribution between flood en ebb. On the average 
the flood lasts less than three hours, while the ebb lasts 
approx. 8 hrs. 30 min. The current reversal at the end of 
ebb time is almost instantaneous and is often 
accompanied by a tidal bore.  
In the natural situation (before the construction of any 
closure work) the maximum current velocities occur 
during flood and reach values of approx. 2 m/s. 
The subsoil at the closure dam site consists mainly of 
sandy silt and silty sand, with occasional clay layers. At 
several locations the sand/silt is very loosely packed and 
has densities below the critical level. This implies that the 
soil can be subject to liquefaction if unsuitable loadings 
occur.  
                                                          
3 Mentioned are in this respect: [1], [8] and [9]. 
4 SOB is an abbreviation of Survey of Bangladesh 
'Unsuitable' loadings may result from earthquakes or 
from scour of the riverbed prior to the closure operations; 
after closure no further scour can take place. The loose 
packing of the subsoil also implies high erodability. 
Substantial changes of the riverbed are to be expected 
once the current patterns at the closure site would be 
disturbed by the closure works. 
C. Bed Protection Works  
The site conditions as described above determined the 
need for an extensive bed protection at and near the axis 
of closure. The main function of the bed protection is to 
stabilize the riverbed, so that any activities related to the 
closure operations do not result in appreciable scour. The 
bed protection would cover a strip along the axis of 
closure (1,300 m) over a width of 150 m.   
The required width followed from the expected scour 
which could develop immediately downstream of a bed 
protection mattress followed by possible liquefaction in 
(part of) the subsoil underneath the mattress. 
The bed protection was constructed by means of so-
called fascine mattresses consisting of a grid of bamboos 
and reed rolls fixed to a polypropylene filter-cloth and 
ballasted with river boulders. A filter-cloth is also 
necessary for geotechnical reasons, namely to spread the 
load of the (future) dam over the subsoil and to prevent 
(or at least limit) local subsoil failure during construction. 
For the gully along the left bank the mattresses were pre-
fabricated on the riverbank and floated to the correct 
location around the time of high water. They were 
subsequently ballasted with boulders and sunk to the 
riverbed. Dimensions of these mattresses were 
approximately 60 by 30 m2.  
On the shoals the mattresses were assembled in-situ 
during low tide (Fig. 13). Dimensions of these mattresses 
varied but were maximum 80 by 50 m2. The expected 
scour downstream of mattresses placed on the shoals was 
much less than expected.  
The highest current velocities occur in the gullies (2.6 
m/s). The gully mattresses (30 m * 60 m) were placed in 
rows of three in the direction of the current, so that it took 
at least three days to proceed 30 m measured along the 
axis of the future dam. During this time the edges of the 
mattresses (especially those, parallel to the currents) 
constituted a change to the bed-roughness, which induced 
extra turbulence. This resulted in substantial scour along 
the edges of the mattresses (Figure 14), so that it became 
more difficult to place the next row of mattresses.  
   
 
Figure 13. Making a bed protection mattress on the shoals at low tide 
. 
 
Figure 14. Scour along mattresses successively  placed in gully along the Left Bank (L/B) 
 
The difficulties can be described as follows: 
(1) The scoured hole (or rather channel) along (a series 
of) mattresses prevented that the next series of 
mattresses could be placed with a properly 
connected overlap: the ballast on the mattress-
section over and above the scoured channel 
resulted in protruding of the reedrolls above the 
earlier placed mattress (because the reed rol1s were 
rather stiff). On the other hand it was not possible 
to reduce the stiffness of the reedrolls, because in 
that case the whole sinking operation would come 
in jeopardy. It is suspected that at some locations 
the lack of a proper overlap has resulted  in further 
scour between the mattresses, though this could not  
be verified by soundings.  
(2) The additional roughness to the riverbed introduced 
by the mattresses has probably a1so led to a 
concentration of the currents in the unprotected parts 
of the gully. As the river bed material in this 
location was rather loosely packed fine sand and silt, 
it was casily erodable. Substantial erosion was 
recorded between the time of commencement of the 
bed protection works in the gully and the time it was 
completed. 
From the above it follows that production and placing 
of mattresses had to be done during the shortest possible 
period. In fact in the gully along the left bank 22 
mattresses were placed during a period of 27 days.  This 
gully tended to become deeper (from SOB – 1.00 m to -
3.5 m) as the mattress operations progressed.  
The gully along the right bank never became that deep 
but reacted at the placing of mattresses by shifting its 
course towards the as yet unprotected shoals (Fig. 15). 
After both banks and gullies had been protected 
mattresses were placed on the shoals. The overall 
number of mattresses ultimately placed was 123 in a 
period of 77 days. The overall area thus protected was 
195 000 m2. 
D. Concluding Remarks  
Fact is that the bed protection, after its completion, has 
prevented deep scour to develop along the axis of closure. 
During its construction, however, it was in fact the 
placing of mattresses which  prompted scour. 
Before the tidal closure, as mentioned earlier, could be 
effected, the contractor had to construct the sill in the 
gullies , on top of the bed protection. This turned out to 
be a difficult and critical operation but ultimately the sill 
was ready a few days before the day of closure.  
 
 
Figure 15. Sketch showing  shifting of the gully near right bank as a consequence of progressing bed protection 
.  
VI CASE HISTORY FIVE : THE RIVER TRAINING 
WORKS FOR THE JAMUNA BRIDGE IN 
BANGLADESH 
A. Prologue  
The Jamuna river, known as the Brahmaputra in India, 
is one of the world's great rivers. With its vast catchment 
area covering the eastern Himalayas, it ranks as the 
world's fourth largest in terms of peak discharge and 
second largest in sediment load. The Jamuna runs in the 
north-south direction dividing Bangladesh in two before 
its confluence with the Ganges and final discharge into 
the Bay of Bengal.  
The Jamuna is a braided river with its channels 
continuously changing course within the braid belt, which 
is flooded in most monsoon seasons and measures as 
much as 40 km wide in some places. Even at its 
narrowest point the braid belt is 15 to 20 km wide. 
The people of this area have long desired a bridge across 
the Jamuna that would bring social, political and 
econonomic integration and development to the region. 
Studies for a road and rail crossing were commissioned as 
long ago as 1964. The studies which, ultimately, resulted 
in the construction of the Jamuna Bridge were 
commissioned in 1986. 
B. The Challenge 
The provision of a fixed bridge crossing of the Jamuna 
is a major engineering task of unusual technical 
complexity. The primary technical issues addressed in the 
engineering development of schemes for this project 
were: 
 
- the size and nature of the braided Jamuna river  
- the weakness of the foundation material and the 
seismicity of the area  
- the requirement of having the project operational 
within three and a half years of contract signing. 
 
In this contribution focus will be only on the control of 
the river5. 
C. Control of the River 
The control of the Jamuna river is a major engineering 
undertaking. The maximum river discharge during flood 
(average 65,000 m3/s), the shifting deeply-scoured 
channels (40-45 m during flood conditions), the seasonal 
river level range (from +6 m to +14 m PWD) and the 
width (15 km at flood stage and 5 km at low water at its 
narrowest point) all imposed considerable demands on 
the design and construction of the river training works. 
The 8m range in river levels led to a seasonal 
construction period of 6.5 months for the river training 
works. 
 
A key issue in this respect was the relation between 
project cost and bridge length. Costings were made for 
the total crossing of 15 km within which the bridge length 
varied from the full 15 km to 3 km. The hydraulic studies 
indicated that the risk of outflanking the training works 
with a 3 km opening was not acceptable. The solution 
selected was a bridge length of approximately 4.8 km 
with river training works (guide bunds) of 3.1 km and 3.2 
km on the east and west banks, respectively (Fig. 16). 
Existing 'hard'points were strengthened some distance 
upstream of the bridge on both banks 
D. Layout River Training Works 
The layout of the river training works as determined at 
the feasibility stage in 1986 was based on the 
comparatively stable situation south of Serajganj of one 
main river channel, where only limited shifting of the 
river banks had been observed for some years. Later, in 
1987-1989, it became apparent that the extreme floods in 
the Jamuna of 1987 and 1988 had considerably distorted 
the equilibrium which had previously existed in the 
selected bridge corridor. 
 
                                                          
5 For a more general and broader description of the Project see [5] and 
[10].  
As can be seen in Fig..17, a second major channel 
developed along the west bank while both the east and 
the west channel tended to move east and west, 
respectively. In the period 1987-1992  the banks at the 
proposed bridge axis moved 1 km to the east and 1.5 km 
to the west, respectively. This completely distorted the 
idea of having a 5 km long bridge with guide bunds built 
in the flood plains at both sides. As a longer bridge meant 
additional cost, it was decided to study the possibility of 
constructing one of the guide bunds on a mid-river char 
(the local name for a sandbank) or in a shallow river 
channel during the dry season. This could turn out to be 
costly, depending on the level of the riverbed and/or the 
location of the char. However, at the time of construction 
an effort would be made to find an optimum between: 
(a) extending the length of the bridge in order to build 
the guide bund on a char  
(b) constructing a more expensive guide bund in a 
shallow channel without extending the bridge length. 
It is one of the major achievements that this unusual 
approach proposed by the consultants was accepted by 
the employer and co-financiers and proved most 
successful. The final location of the west guide bund 
could only be determined by the Consultants on 15 
October 1995 as the river levels fell, i.e. 19 months after 
award of the major construction contracts. This approach 
resulted in no additional project costs and the relevant 
provisional sums for contingencies were not required. 
E. Cross-Section of Guide Bunds 
The cross-sectional design of the guide bunds as 
adopted during the design stage was based on the 
following principal considerations: 
 
- extreme bend scour   
- a depth of bund that is capable of being dredged 
having due regard to economic considerations  
- slope stabifity  
- protection of slope   
- economic considerations 
 
In the period that the designs were made the knowledge 
about the morphology of the river Jamuna was still very 
limited6.  
 
During the feasibility studies ground investigations, 
mathematical and physical modelling, analysis by means 
of remote sensing and river surveys (in so far as funds 
were available for that purpose) had provided valuable 
information but much 'engineering judgement' was still 
required in developing the design. On the basis of 
hydrographic surveys and discharge measurements 
various scour formulas were developed by Delft 
Hydraulics. 
                                                          
6 Since then, this situation has improved thanks to the river studies 
carried out after the flood of 1988 in the context of the Flood Action 
Plan (FAP). 
Figure 16.  Satellite image with superimposed guide bunds and reclamation for Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge 
 
 
Figure 17. Low water channels of the river Jamuna near the bridge axis during the period 1987-1995 
 
In order to limit construction cost probabilistic design 
methods were used to determine maximum permissible 
scour depths for which the design would be made. 
 
Extreme scour is a typical feature of the Jamuna: river 
branches flow in thick, loosely packed, alluvial 
depositions of, predominantly silty sand. These river 
branches change continuously (direction, location). The 
river transports much sediment, especially during the 
high water period. When the water level goes down, the 
channels are silting up. Scouring (and the related bank 
erosion) takes place during channel shifting and during 
the increase in river flow in the high water season. 
Extreme scour is due to local disturbances in the cross- 
section (for instance by guide bunds and bridge piers), in 
outer bends of channels and at the confluence of river 
branches. 
 
Scour is an important technical parameter for the level 
of the toe of the underwater slope as well as for the 
foundation depth of the bridge piling. It also determines 
the  magnitude of the dredging to be carried out.  
 
The scour to be expected along a guide bund can be of 
the order of 40 m, relative to the level of the flood plain 
(PWD + 12 m).  Two extreme avenues are open to 
provide protection against currents to such depths: 
 
(a) Provide a sufficient quantity of erosion resistant 
material along the perimeter of the guide bund, 
and leave it to "nature" to deposit this material at 
the anticipated depth during the scour process.  
If the erosion resistant material is provided at 
original ground level (flood plain level), no 
dredging work will be required for the guide 
bund.  The principle discussed is known as the 
"falling apron" sometimes referred to as the 
"launched apron".  This principle has been 
adopted for the guide bund at the Hardinge 
bridge (Bangladesh) and also at the bridge 
across the Brahmaputra near Kaliabhomora 
(India). 
 
(b) Dredge a trench to full (expected scour ) depth 
and cover one side of the trench with an erosion 
resistant protection; the covered slope will 
become the river side of the guide bund. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideally, gentle slopes extending down to the full 
expected erosion depth are preferred.  Unfortunately, in 
the case of the Jamuna Bridge dredging to full depth 
would: 
 
- lead to very large dredging volumes (order of 22 
million m3 per guide bund); such volumes would 
be very difficult to handle within the short 
construction season available for the guide bund. 
 
- require very specialized dredging equipment, of 
which it is doubtful that it would be available in 
the market. 
 
- be very expensive. 
 
Cost comparisons have been made for combinations of 
dredging to a certain depth (with proper slope protection 
on the dredged slope) and a falling apron over the 
"remaining" height. 
 
The total cost increases with increasing depth.  For this 
increased cost it is obvious that a higher degree of safety 
of behaviour of the guide bund would be achieved. 
 
During the design stage the Consultants proposed for 
both guide bunds to adopt everywhere a 'toe' level of 
PWD -18m as the initial level of the falling apron for the 
following reasons: 
 
- the "remaining" falling height (10 m) for the 
apron is large, but not too large to implement 
any additional measures to protect the slope 
should this become necessary. 
 
- the dredging depth is very substantial (up to 
30m, measured from the level of the flood 
plain), but can be dredged with equipment which 
is available in the market or which can easily be 
adapted. 
 
- though requiring a major effort, it is possible to 
complete an entire guide bund within one 
working season. 
F. Design Adaptations during Construction 
It should be anticipated for a project of this nature that 
design adaptations would be required during construction. 
These adaptations could be, among other things, due to 
one or more of the following circumstances: 
 
- erosion of river banks resulting in changed bank 
lines and another site configuration  
- major shifting of river channels  
- increased flow through secondary creeks and 
floodways  
- discovery during construction of sub-soil 
conditions not known at the time of design 
(despite extensive site investigation)  
- delays in the start of the construction period.  
 
In practice, nearly all the above circumstances occurred 
during the construction period. This meant that the design 
of both guide bunds and the Bhuapur hard point had to be 
adapted with regard to location, plan form and cross-
section. The change in location and plan form was on the 
one hand due to channel shifting and on the other to land 
acquisition constraints. The change in cross section in the 
first instance was due to difficulties encountered during 
construction of the west guide bund. It became evident 
that the soil during and after dredging was very sensitive 
to slight dynamic disturbances7. It was therefore decided 
to adopt a more gentle gradient (see below). 
G. Construction of River Training Works  
Construction of the river training works, commencing 
with the east guide bund, started on 15 October 1994 in 
accordance with the revised works programme. During 
this period it was necessary to dredge the work harbour 
and to reclaim areas in the flood plain using the sand 
dredged from the harbour basin. These areas were 
required by the two major contracts (bridge and river 
training works) for offices, workshops, working areas and 
residential areas for the site staff. One year after start of 
construction, the location of the west guide bund was 
fixed. It was the intention to complete this guide bund, 
including all reclamation and closure of the western river 
channel as well as some secondary channels, in a period 
of 6.5 months. This became impossible, mainly due to the 
unforeseen behaviour of the sub-soil. In November-
December 1995 a number of minor and major slips 
occurred in rapid succession in the dredged 1-in-3.5 
slope. This prompted the consultant to change the slope 
gradient to1-in- 5 down to a level of PWD - 4 m and to 1-
in-6 between PWD -4 m and the toe (Fig. 18).  
 
The gradient of the slope in the amended design is 
considerably more gentle than in the original design. This 
led to an adjustment (outside the bridge corridor) of the 
toe level of the protection works (PWD -15 m instead of -
18 m) because model tests carried out in the context of 
the Flood Action Plan [2] had demonstrated that a more 
gentle slope reduces extreme bend scour.  
H. The Application of Fascine Mattresses 
Despite the slips at the west guide bund, the slope 
protection works in general were carried out as planned. 
This was due to the application of a modernized version 
of the old Dutch fascine mattress. A Dutch fascine 
matfress historically was of 0.5 m thick brushwood 
construction in units of 1000 to 2000 m2 which, after 
fabrication during low tide, were floated to the site. After 
positioning, they would be ballasted and sunk at the turn 
of the tide and a final ballast layer placed by dumping 
stones from flat top barges. 
                                                          
7 This sensitivity is due to the presence of mica  in combination with a 
relative density which is lower than 0.50 to 0.55. The low relative 
density in turn is caused by the rapid silting up of channels at the end of 
the flood season. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Cross section of guide bund outside bridge corridor 
 
  
The fascines had a triple function. They acted as a filter 
layer, provided a rigid framework to the mattress and 
provided buoyancy. With current designs, the filter 
function has been taken over by a composite geotextile. 
In Bangladesh this geotextile is attached to a rigid 
framework of split bamboos which also provide 
buoyancy. For the Jamuna river training works the 
largest mattress dimensions were 30 m by 155 M (4,650 
m2). After positioning, the floating mattress was 
gradually sunk by ballasting with boulders. Final 
ballasting, by placing rock up to 100 kg, was effected by 
means of a side stone-dumping vessel. This vessel, with 
capacity of up to 1300 t of rock, was positioned by 
means of satellites (GPS) and its combined movements 
and dumping rate controlled by computers. 
At the west guide bund, 141 mattresses having an overall 
area of 480,000 m2 were placed in a period of 146 days. 
At the east guide bund 93 mattresses measuring 400,000 
m2 were placed in 121 days. The side stone-dumping 
vessel was operated 24 hours a day and reached dumping 
productions of 10 000 t a day. The guide bunds, which 
were constructed in trenches, required a total of 26 
million m3 of dredging. 
 
I. Concluding Comments 
 
Through co-operation by all the parties involved, 
including the Bangladesh govermnent, the co-financiers, 
the consultants and the contractors, the political, 
economic and technical challenges of the project have 
been successfully managed. The river training works 
were completed in June 1997 (Fig. 19) and the last span 
of the bridge was completed in March 1998. The bridge 
opened for traffic on 23 June 1998 and has, since then, 
more than satisfied the expectations.  
During the high water season of the year 2000 scour in 
front of the toe of the guide bund was locally 5 m (water 
depth 33 m) below level of the toe (PWD -15 m) and the 
falling apron prevented slides or undercutting of the 
slope. So far, the river training works have successfully 
passed the attack by nine annual floods without any 
damage. 
 
In 2001 the designer (Royal Haskoning.), contractor 
(HAM-Van Oord ACZ) and employer (Jamuna 
Multipurpose Bridge Authority) jointly received the Prof. 
Dr. Ir J.F. Agema Award for the design and construction 
of the river training works for the Jamuna Bridge.
 
  
Figure 19. The western, 3.2 km long, guide bund, seen from the North (upstream) after its completion (April 1997). The 5  km long bridge 
is still  under construction in the background. The picture is dominated by the wide, 27 m deep, trench, especially dredged to 
enable construction of the gentle (1V:5H to 1V:6H) under water rip rap slope. Above water on the slope one can see , 
intersected by a narrow berm,  the black strip of the open stone asphalt and the hand-placed riprap 
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